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AGAINST (CONSTITUTIONAL) 
SETTLEMENT 
OUR UNSETILED CONSTITUTION: A 
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. Louis Michael Seidman.1 
University Press. 2001. Pp. 260. $35.00. 
Brannon P. Denninl 
NEW 
AND 
Yale 
A decade ago, Glenn Reynolds published a brief essay in 
which he invited scholars to view the activity of the Supreme 
Court through the lens of the then-emerging science of Chaos 
Theory.3 Reynolds argued that students of the Court might learn 
from Chaos Theory's insight that seemingly random and unpre-
dictable phenomena actually masked order, predictability, and 
stability. "Like the drop on the end of its faucet," Reynolds 
wrote, "a legal principle tends to expand to its logical limits, and 
then break off, to be replaced by a new one. "4 But "unlike scien-
tists, who have learned better," legal scholars were still at work 
generating foundational theories to predict how and when this 
process takes place.5 That these efforts at prediction had failed 
was of no surprise to Reynolds- especially as those theories at-
tempted to predict the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
Court's multi-member nature, its control over its docket, its rela-
tive lack of constraint in resolving issues before it, and the effects 
of politics on the Court make it particularly unpredictable.6 For 
Reynolds, it all added up to the conclusion that the Court was 
unlikely to "ever reach a truly 'final' answer to very many ques-
tions that come before it, though most theories of constitutional 
I. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University. 
I thank Barry Friedman, Ted Ruger, Rob Pearigen, John Vile, Howard Walthall, and 
Glenn Reynolds for comments and suggestions. 
3. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Coun, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110 (1991). 
4. Id at 112 (footnote omitted). 
5. Id at 112, 113. 
6. See id at 114. 
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interpretation seem grounded in the assumption that such an-
swers exist." 7 
Then Reynolds asked whether this lack of finality wasn't a 
benefit of our system, both politically and economically. The po-
litical benefit, he argued, stemmed from "the fluidity of the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence over time [meant that] no coalition 
is set in stone over time, and that people are often pressed to be-
come involved in politics to protect their interests, even when 
the judicial system has spoken."8 Economically, this predictable 
unpredictability was important because "the 'chaotic' nature of 
the judicial system may mean that stagnation through special-
interest domination is unlikely over the long term, as periodic 
shifts by the Supreme Court lead to the periodic need to renego-
tiate political/economic alliances," which, in turn, result in the 
maintenance of political and economic flexibility.9 
Reynolds's doubts about the possibility of final settlements 
of contested constitutional issues, and his tentative identification 
of benefits to a regime in which those issues were not settled-
not even by the U.S. Supreme Court-have much in common 
with the theory put forth by Louis Michael Seidman in his new 
book, Our Unsettled Constitution. Seidman argues that we are 
mistaken to think that the central mission of constitutional law is 
to effect settlement of contested political issues. Theories de-
signed around that vision are thus fatally flawed and doomed to 
failure, he concludes. Seidman instead suggests that constitu-
tional law exists to unsettle questions that are settled elsewhere 
in our political system, providing those who lose in the political 
process an opportunity to upset political settlement in the courts. 
This judicial safety valve, Seidman contends, offers political los-
ers an incentive to work within the existing political community. 
Because judicial unsettlements themselves can become objects 
for unsettlement, constitutional law has, and ought to have, an 
ephemeral quality that frustrates attempts to settle constitutional 
questions for all time. 
In the pages that follow, I will summarize both Seidman's 
critique of constitutional theory, as currently practiced, as well as 
his description and defense of "unsettlement theory." Then I will 
7. Id See also Barry Friedman, Dialague and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 
577 (1993) (arguing that little in constitutional law is ever settled, and that this is a good 
thing). 
8. ld at 115. 
9. Id 
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highlight some possible problems with Seidman's unsettlement 
theory. 
I 
Seidman acknowledges that we are living "in an age of 
growing doubt as to the utility of any normative theory of consti-
tutional law," but he argues that we have to be able to give some 
account of how we approach constitutional law, since it is not go-
ing away. (pp. 1, 3-5) A would-be theorist's challenge, then, is 
"to formulate a general approach to constitutional law that takes 
into account the intractable nature of our political disagreements 
instead of attempting to suppress them." (p. 7) Seidman's thesis 
is that "we can accomplish this task by reversing the two central 
assumptions upon which most prior theory has been based: that 
principles of constitutional law should be independent of our po-
litical commitments and that the role of constitutional law is to 
settle political disagreement." (p. 7) 
Seidman defines constitutional law as "a system designed to 
prevent the polity from deconstituting. It accomplishes this task 
by establishing terms of agreement to which all members of the 
polity can subscribe (or at least can be expected to subscribe) and 
which prevent the polity from disintegrating when confronted 
with political disagreement." (p. 19) What this system amounts 
to, then, "is a series of metarules or principles that allow people 
to abstract from ordinary disagreements," which he terms "the 
rules of constitutional settlement." (p. 20) But, he asks, "[h]ow 
are these rules to be justified when people disagree"? (p. 22) It 
turns out, argues Seidman, that the justification for adhering to 
settlement rules in the face of disagreement with outcomes owe 
little to the rules themselves, and more to ulterior motives of 
those in the political community, such as the desire to preserve 
the group, thinking that, in the aggregate, the types of settlement 
will benefit one in the long run. (pp. 22-26) 
These rules of constitutional settlement have a further prob-
lem, though. There is often disagreement as to the substantive 
content of those rules and what they require. This means, for 
Seidman, that constitutional settlements are bound to fail. 
The settlements are supposed to allow us to resolve contested 
political disputes by reference to a "higher" set of rules on 
which there is agreement. But there is in fact no agreement on 
the higher set of rules, and to the extent that the competing 
sets of rules are foundational, there is no prospect of formu-
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lating arguments that would (or should) create agreement. 
Moreover, even if there were agreement, there is no reason 
why people should feel bound to follow the rules in circum-
stances where those rules produce results that are perceived 
as undesirable. (p. 28) 
Instead of seeking settlement rules that forestall or short-
circuit potentially divisive political controversies, Seidman ar-
gues that constitutional law should provide a forum for those 
frustrated by losses in the political system, and offer them an 
outlet for their frustration, in an effort to retain losers' loyalty to 
the system as a whole. Unsettlement theory allows them tore-
main within the political community, and, it is hoped, keeps 
them in an on-going political dialogue. The goal, writes Seidman, 
is to "build a community founded on consent by enticing losers 
into a continuing conversation." (pp. 8-9) Underlying unsettle-
ment theory is Seidman's vision for a just community that is in-
clusive. Exclusion from the community, especially from commu-
nity dialogue over divisive issues, is to be avoided if at all 
possible. 
II 
But even if actual settlement is impossible, because of the 
existence of multiple "settlements" generated by alternative in-
terpretations, constitutional law is, he argues, "inevitable," be-
cause when conflict arises it must be settled acc·ording to some 
process. "[L]etting things come out the way they come out," 
Seidman writes, is not an attractive option, "[u]nless we are 
ready to give up not just on constitutional law but also on all our 
political commitments." (p. 33) If there is disagreement, Seid-
man does not dispute that there will be a settlement, because the 
disagreement has to be resolved one way or another. What 
Seidman argues, however, is that we are wrong to look to consti-
tutional law to provide those settlements. 
Courts should instead embrace the open texture of the law, 
and create unsettlement opportunities for political losers. 
"[P]oliticians," Seidman writes, "can be counted upon to find a 
modus vivendi .... Of course, any resolution that politicians de-
vise will make some people unhappy." (p. 159) But the Court it-
self should not try to settle disputes through constitutional law 
because 
displacing a political with a constitutional settlement only 
makes the exclusionary problem worse. It is one thing to lose 
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a political fight. It is another to be told that the loss is irre-
versible and foundational. When the Supreme Court uses 
constitutional rhetoric to shut down an argument by imposing 
one potential settlement rather than another, it is doing some-
thing more than announcing the outcome of a political strug-
gle. It is attempting to constitute the community in a fashion 
that excludes the losers for reasons that cannot be explained 
in a fashion comprehensible to them. (p. 159) 
785 
Unsettlement works, he argues, because it "establishes a dif-
ferent sort of neutrality." (p. 202) By emphasizing "the contra-
dictions in constitutional law ... both sides ... can go on using 
constitutional rhetoric that appeals to our core commitments" 
and "have a reason not to sever their ties with the community." 
(p. 202) If scholars and judges could abandon the notion that 
constitutional law settled matters, then judicial decisions would 
seem "worthy of respect not because they are substantively right 
but because they are (or at least can be) grounded in a method 
and a culture that encourages uncertainty, ambivalence, and con-
tradiction." (p. 204) 
III 
Why should it fall to the courts to discharge this unusual 
"unsettlement" function? Seidman argues that judges (particu-
larly Supreme Court Justices) occupy a position unique among 
our political actors. Their ability to serve as public officials while 
retaining much of their privacy allows them to personify the con-
flicts between public and private, between the particular and the 
universal, that Seidman finds at the heart of both political con-
flicts and constitutional law. Rather than adopting what he sees 
as late twentieth century constitutionalism's "unenviable choice 
between cynical withdrawal on the one hand and hypocritical, 
ineffective posturing on the other," (p. 74) Seidman embraces 
the contestable nature of the boundaries of constitutional law. 
He argues that it is precisely the lack of fixed boundaries (p. 75) 
in constitutional law, and judges' ability to exploit them, that 
continues to hold promise for a just community. 
Much of contemporary constitutional theory, Seidman 
writes, consists of critiques of paired opposites-freedom vs. co-
ercion, local vs. national, feasance vs. nonfeasance, public vs. 
private, equality vs. inequality-that characterize much of con-
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stitutional law.10 He includes critiques of an overarching paired 
opposite in constitutional law-law vs. politics.11 At a micro 
level, Seidman argues, the efforts to fix boundaries in constitu-
tional law-usually with reference to the paired opposites de-
scribed above-replays political communities' efforts to fix 
boundaries at a macro level. This effort also involves a choice 
between another paired opposite: universalism and particular-
ism. "[T]he unresolved conflict between particularism and uni-
versalism," he argues, "helps explain why and how the bounda-
ries of political community remain contested .... It follows that a 
contested and uncertain boundary, formed by the unending 
struggle between particularist and universalist urges, may be the 
best means of ensuring a just peace." (p. 81) 
This conflict is one that is played out in constitutionallaw,12 
as well as in other facets of human political life. And while 
boundaries must be set, conflicts settled, he writes that "we can-
not, and would not want to, finally resolve our conflicting im-
pulses toward particularism and universalism," which means that 
"the boundaries between constitutional law's paired opposites 
cannot be resolved according to law." (p. 82) So how can one set 
(tentative) boundaries and resolve conflict, at least temporarily? 
Seidman looks to the one set of political actors who straddle a 
unique line between their private and public roles, and whom 
one may see as the personification of this tension in life and the 
law: judges. 
Judges can unsettle, Seidman argues, because they are able 
to retain control over their private lives by virtue of their insula-
tion and relative independence. In his words, judges are-and 
should be-"separated in some measure from the political out-
comes they criticize" in their rulings. (p. 83) Moreover, the 
common law method of inductive reasoning reinforces the par-
ticularist impulse, even in the rendering of decisions that have 
universal implications. If presented with new or different or 
changed facts in a different case, the previous case does not nec-
essarily bind, or at least is not immune from alteration. (pp. 84-
85) For Seidman, this means that judges "will be sensitive to the 
10. Seep. 62: "In its classical form, constitutional law privileges private over public, 
local over national, freedom over coercion, feasance over nonfeasance, and equality over 
inequality." 
11. See p. 63: "Law is neutral, nondiscretionary, objective and rational. Politics is 
biased, idiosyncratic, subjective, and nonrational. Legislatures engage in politics; courts 
enforce the law." 
12. See p. 81: "The conflict between the particular and the universal parallels the 
linked pairs that ... are central to ordinary constitutional practice." 
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contradictory demands of public and private values," which 
"helps guarantee a permanently contested boundary between 
public and private." (p. 85) 
This method and culture could be fostered by judges them-
selves who would make decisions (the case must, eventually, be 
decided), but who would also recognize the impossibility of 
"neutrality" and thus be less inclined even to attempt permanent 
solutions to perennially contested political matters. A combina-
tion of judges' self-awareness of the contestibility of the issues 
they decide and the relative political insulation and independ-
ence judges enjoy, Seidman argues, would serve to legitimate 
their decisions.13 
IV 
Seidman acknowledges that while constitutional law harbors 
the potential for employing unsettlement theory, that potential 
has remained largely unrealized. Seidman argues that American 
judges-especially Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court-have 
instead insisted that their job is to effect constitutional settle-
ment. This has led judges to promote a view that most of the 
public just doesn't buy: that they are no more than disinterested 
appliers of "the law" who bravely rush in to settle political con-
troversies based on an impartial application of "the rules" as 
they see them. To do otherwise, the argument runs, would be to 
move from law into politics, with all sorts of adverse conse-
quences for courts' institutionallegitimacy.14 Seidman dismisses 
this fear as "simply a bugaboo." (p. 92) 
In cases involving constitutional structure-separation of 
powers cases, for example-making such a frank admission of 
the principles' indeterminacy is unlikely to draw the Court's le-
gitimacy into question. Suggestions that the dispute should be 
13. He writes: 
[A]lthough unsettlement does not mean that courts will invalidate all laws 
touching on religion, it does mean that all these laws pose constitutional issues, 
and that these issues cannot be resolved by reference to a grand theory that fi-
nally works out the conflict. This, too, is what unsettlement means. Moreover, 
precisely because the resolution of these issues is unconstrained by theory,judi-
cial decisions will reflect the individual commitments, belief systems, and preju-
dices of the Justices making them .... Regardless of our views on the merits ... 
the decisions gain legitimacy from the fact that they are rendered by actors who 
themselves straddle the public and private spheres and can therefore police an 
uncertain, shifting, and contested boundary between them. (pp. 207-08) 
14. The example that leaps readily to mind-which Seidman uses-is the plurality 
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. (pp. 91-92) 
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left to the political process, he notes, are almost incoherent, 
since it is that very process that generated the constitutional con-
flict. (p. 160) Moreover, as he notes at several places, deference 
itself is a form of constitutional settlement. (p. 160-61) 
As for judicial enforcement of enumerated and unenumer-
ated rights, Seidman urges an 
end [to] our obsession with the rhetorical distinction between 
activism and restraint and focus instead on the real dispute, 
between libertarian and interventionist activists. Both liber-
tarians and interventionists are prepared to substitute judicial 
for political judgments. But whereas libertarians favor an ac-
tive judiciary to keep the political branches passive, interven-
tionists favor an active judiciary to make the political 
branches more active. Put differently, whereas libertarians 
embrace the private conception of rights that associates free-
dom with government nonfeasance, interventionists embrace 
the public conception that links freedom to government inter-
vention. (pp. 184-85) 
In other words, not only is "restraint" simply another form of 
settlement, but it can be characterized as another form of activ-
ism as well. For Seidman, honesty and transparency demand that 
Justices and judges drop posturing in favor of candor. No one 
believes that judges are disinterested or that the law is "neutral," 
so why insult the public's intelligence by pretending otherwise? 
But how do judges and Justices implement unsettlement 
theory? What does an unsettlement decision look like? How 
would a judge or Justice write one? Other than to say that judges 
ought "to candidly acknowledge that their choice between set-
tlements is politically driven and contestable . . . and that the 
choice between structures will ... be determined by politically 
controversial preferences for outcomes," Seidman is vague. (p. 
159) Further suggestions include those mentioned above: con-
ceding the underdeterminacy of the legal principles employed to 
decide constitutional cases; recognizing that delegation to politi-
cal branches or private decisionmakers is not so much restraint 
as simply another attempt at settlement; skepticism of reduction-
ists' resort to paired opposites; and resisting the temptation to 
employ bright-line tests over those requiring consideration of the 
totality of circumstances, balancing, or the like. (pp. 105-08) 
However, while Seidman discusses some Supreme Court 
opinions to show how their reasoning is vulnerable to unsettle-
ment, (e.g., pp. 125-34) he never takes the next step. He never 
offers an example of an opinion that strikes the proper balance 
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between the need to decide a case, and the need to avoid the 
temptation to create settlement rules for the constitutional issue 
involved. As I describe in more detail below, I think that this 
lack of concern with the ability of courts to implement his theory 
is an unfortunate omission that diminishes its ultimate utility. 
v 
Seidman has written a complex, challenging book; my sum-
mary of his argument is of necessity an oversimplification. While 
there can be no question whether Seidman has contributed sig-
nificantly to the debate over constitutionalism, judicial review, 
and the proper role of the judiciary, elements of his theory are 
(forgive me) unsettling. 
While Seidman did not set out to write a philosophical trea-
tise on the creation of a just political community, I did find my-
self wishing for more description on his part of what his criteria 
for a "just community" were. Seidman only describes one-
inclusiveness-which is the one criterion most relevant to his un-
settlement theory. But his goal of inclusiveness highlights an-
other gap in Seidman's argument. He never offers an explicit de-
fense of his position that inclusiveness ought to be constitutional 
law's categorical imperative. Is it so bad that we have used con-
stitutional law to effect settlements that have, over time, ex-
cluded slave-owners, white supremacists, secessionists, and 
would-be theocrats from our constitutional conversations? 
Should all of our constitutional principles be subject to unset-
tlement? Seidman would probably argue that unsettlement can 
occur whether we wish it to or not. He might also point to re-
peated caveats that unsettlement only gives others the opportu-
nity to unsettle. (p. 9) Yet if certain issues (secession, slavery, de 
jure racial discrimination) have been "settled," or at least if most 
people believe they have been, then the opportunity to unsettle 
that Seidman holds out to opponents of those settlements looks 
to be cold comfort. It is unclear whether an illusory remedy to 
losers of political settlements will be sufficient to retain their 
loyalty. 
There are other problems with unsettlement theory that 
would likely surface in practice. As mentioned above, I did not 
come away with any idea how a judicial decision could at once 
decide a case, yet embrace the open-texture of the law, all while 
providing useful precedent for the law's continuing develop-
ment. In addition, Seidman never addresses how unsettlement 
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theory could work in a hierarchical court system. Though he 
talks about the role of "the courts" and of "judges," he really 
seems to mean the "Supreme Court" and "Justices." While 
Seidman is not alone among constitutional theorists to short-
change the role federal and state courts play in implementing 
constitutional decisions, the omission of consideration in the 
context of unsettlement theory is glaring. 
Whatever the fate of constitutional settlement in the Su-
preme Court, lower courts must implement the Court's decisions 
and apply them to the myriad fact situations that make up the 
workaday docket of the district courts and the courts of appeals. 
At that level, lawyers and clients do expect a settlement of their 
case. If the Supreme Court eschews attempts at settlement for 
"fuzzier" opinions, the likely result is that lower courts forced to 
implement such decisions will minimize their significance and 
simply rely on the legal status quo. Evidence from the lower 
courts' post-Lopez Commerce Clause decisions bears this out.15 
Moreover, by repeatedly admonishing lower courts that any 
overruling of Supreme Court precedent should be left to the 
Court itself, the Supreme Court has limited lower courts' ability 
to anticipate or fully implement successful unsettlement opinions 
issued by the Court.16 
The difficulty that the lower courts judges have had imple-
menting Lopez, even after clarifying opinions in United States v. 
Morrison and United States v. Jones, raises another important 
question that Seidman does not address: the institutional compe-
tence of courts at all levels to embrace and implement unsettle-
ment theoryY Successful implementation of unsettlement theory 
would require judges to abandon two cherished articles of pro-
fessional faith- that courts settle matters by deciding cases and 
that they do so by applying the law objectively, while recognizing 
that legal principles are sometimes incomplete-in favor of a de-
cisionmaking process that could be perceived as more politi-
cized. It is questionable whether judges could embrace the law's 
open texture and admit the contestability of legal principles 
15. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: 
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 
1255 (2003); Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lo-
pez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution, and Nobody Came?, 
2000 Wise. L. Rev. 369. 
16. Denning and Reynolds, 55 Ark. L. Rev. at 1305-08 (cited in note 15). 
17. See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,_ 
Mich. L. Rev. 885, 932-46 (2003) (testing theories of interpretation by reference to the 
institutional capacities of courts to implement them successfully). 
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without effecting a major change in the way American courts 
operated, and, more important, without affecting public percep-
tion of the judiciary's role in our system of government. 
In fact, unsettlement theory, as described by Seidman, may 
have embedded in it the potential to undo itself. Recall that 
Seidman defended the role of the judiciary with reference to 
judges' unique position in our political system. They are public 
officials who render written opinions in controversies making 
them somewhat publicly accountable. The power is further tem-
pered by the fact that they settle disputes at the retail level, 
rather than at wholesale (like the legislature), according to a 
professional ethos of disinterestedness I described above. How-
ever, judges are also able to preserve their independence and 
their privacy because of the manner in which they are selected 
and their lifetime tenure (for federal judges anyway). 
If judges embrace Seidman's call to reject claims to objectiv-
ity and treat all legal principles as contestable, all settlements as 
temporary, and all claims to neutrality as mere pretension, then 
one wonders how long judges will be able to straddle the public-
private divide. If the public (and other politicians) see judges as 
performing a task that requires little or no specialized knowl-
edge-one not very different from the role elected officials per-
form, it seems that the case for the judicial privileges deemed es-
sential to the judicial independence, like the selection process 
and the lifetime tenure, is substantially weakened.18 
VI 
Still, I think that Seidman's contribution to the debate is an 
important one. He asks the right questions: what does constitu-
tional law do, exactly, in our system? What should it do? Though 
I have doubts about making inclusiveness the overriding value in 
our constitutional system, I think that Seidman is on to some-
thing when he suggests that providing political losers the oppor-
tunity to challenge settlements in court is an important function 
that constitutional law performs. It follows, then, that we ought 
to leave access to that avenue for change open to as many per-
sons as possible, and that courts ought to give their constitu-
. 18. The present battles over the staffing of the courts of appeals may provide a pre-
view of what would happen at every level should JUdges adopt the role that Seidman's 
unsettlement theory envisions. 
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tional arguments a respectful hearing, even if the arguments are 
ultimately rejected. 
As Seidman points out, the fact that the extent of the Sec-
ond Amendment's protection of private gun ownership has 
never been settled by the Supreme Court means that both pro-
ponents and opponents of gun control can invoke the Amend-
ment to support their contradictory positions. This may ensure, 
as he feels, that "the very guns receiving uncertain Second 
Amendment protection will never be used to settle our political 
disputes."19 (p. 209) Seidman's work comes as a welcome re-
minder that courts are often the last hope for our most marginal-
ized and alienated citizens. When they resort to litigation to vin-
dicate what they see as their constitutional rights, judges (and 
scholars) ought to afford them a fair hearing-and not label their 
arguments as "crazy" or "fringe." One might even argue that the 
more out-of-the-mainstream the legal argument, the more time a 
judge or scholar ought to spend trying to explain where the ar-
gument goes off track. 
Moreover, his skepticism about the ability of theorists and 
courts to effect final, unalterable constitutional settlements, and 
about their value (assuming settlement is even possible), is re-
freshing after a decades-long quest for a unified theory of consti-
tutional law that could produce answers to all of our constitu-
tional questions.20 Even a reader who takes issue with Seidman's 
theoretical prescriptions would be hard-pressed to disagree with 
his argument that judges and scholars should not uncritically ac-
cept constitutional law's familiar categories (freedom vs. coer-
cion, feasance vs. nonfeasance, etc.) and should be aware that at-
19. I am reminded of a similar observation of Alexander Bickel's comment about 
winning the Pentagon Papers case. After the case, he wrote, 
the conditions in which government will not be allowed to restrain publication 
are now clearer and perhaps more stringent than they have been. We are, or at 
least we feel, freer when we feel no need to extend our freedom. The conflict 
and contention by which we extend freedom seem to mark, or at least to 
threaten, a contradiction; and in truth they do, for they endanger an assumed 
freedom which appeared limitless because its limits were untried. Appearance 
and reality are nearly one. We extend the legal reality of freedom at some cost 
in its limitless appearance. And the cost is real. 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 61 (Yale U. Press, 1975). In other words, 
an additional disadvantage of having settled, bright·line rules is that they encourage 
regulation right up to the legal limit. Those regulations might never have issu.ed prior to 
settlement, because of legal uncertainty. 
20. See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: The 
Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations (U. of Chicago Press, 2002) (describing 
the efforts of liberal and conservative scholars in the 1980s and 1990s to produce such 
meta-theories). 
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tempts at constitutional settlement are as subject to the law of 
unintended consequences as any other human endeavor. 
The lack of final answers in constitutional law, and the pro-
visional nature even of "landmark" Supreme Court cases tends 
to make the American political and legal culture robust. This ro-
bust nature, in turn, may render both resistant to the decay and 
corruption that accompany the apathy and torpor that Seidman 
see as debilitating for democracies. Seidman writes: 
Healthy political communities are not fixed and static, and 
they do not have things worked out. Their past, as well as 
their future, is not settled. Instead, they are constantly rein-
venting their own histories and meanings .... Political com-
munity is maintained precisely because there is no permanent 
settlement and, indeed, no exclusive, agreed-upon method for 
amending temporary settlements. Instead, the community is 
built upon an endless battle, with no fixed rules and no hope 
of final resolution.Z1 (p. 55) 
Others have urged scholars to be more modest in their aims 
when writing about constitutional law in hopes of remaking it, 
Seidman's book furnishes a complementary caution that those 
who make constitutional law should similarly be modest about 
their ability to settle highly contested matters on constitutional 
grounds so tha't constitutional amendment is the only avenue left 
to the losing party. The inability of the U.S. Supreme Court to 
settle the issue of slavery (Dred Scott v. Sanford), abortion (Roe 
v. Wade), or public prayer (Engle v. Vitale), and the fact that the 
Court emerged from each attempt somewhat worse for wear 
suggests that there is wisdom in Seidman's counsel. 
21. See also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 
1635 (1995). 
